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Abstract: The study of threat and 
fear appeal arguments has given rise 
to a sizeable literature. Even within a 
public health context, much is now 
known about how these arguments 
work to gain the public's compliance 
with health recommendations. Not-
withstanding this level of interest in, 
and examination of, these argu-
ments, there is one aspect of these 
arguments that still remains unex-
plored. That aspect concerns the 
heuristic function of these arguments 
within our thinking about public 
health problems. Specifically, it is 
argued that threat and fear appeal 
arguments serve as valuable short-
cuts in our reasoning, particularly 
when that reasoning is subject to 
biases that are likely to diminish the 
effectiveness of public health mes-
sages. To this extent, they are ra-
tionally warranted argument forms 
rather than fallacies, as has been 
their dominant characterization in 
logic. 
Key words: argumentum ad baculum; 
argument; heuristics; public health 
Resume: L'etude des arguments qui 
font appel a la menace ou a la peur a 
donne naissance a une litterature 
abondante. Meme dans un contexte 
de sante publique, on sait beaucoup 
comment employer ces arguments 
pour persuader le public de se con-
former aux recommandations de 
sante. Malgre ce niveau d'interet 
pour ces arguments et l'examen de 
ceux-ci, ils ont un aspect qui reste 
encore inexplore. Cet aspect con-
cerne la fonction heuristique de ces 
arguments au sein de notre reflexion 
sur des problemes de sante publique. 
Plus precisement, je soutiens que les 
arguments qui font appel a la men-
ace ou a la peur servent de raccour-
cis utiles dans nos raisonnements, en 
particulier lorsque que les raisonne-
ments sont vulnerables a des pre-
juges qui vont probablement dimin-
uer l'efficacite des messages de sante 
publique. Dans cette mesure, ces 
types d'arguments sont plutot ra-
tionnellement justifies que falla-
cieux, comme cela a ete leur caracte-
risation dominante dans la logique 
cognitive bias; fallacy; fear appeal 
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1. Introduction 
Public health scientists face a number of challenges as they seek 
to protect the health of a population. They must transmit a mes-
sage which is unpalatable to those whose behaviour the message 
is attempting to modify (e.g., people who smoke). They must 
couch this message in terms which are readily comprehensible 
to a public that is not well versed in scientific or medical mat-
ters. They must ensure that a message is sufficiently salient to 
compete with other messages, many of which involve issues that 
have greater immediacy for the public (e.g., choice of a mort-
gage versus the development of skin cancer 20 years hence-
forth). In all these areas, public health scientists are now guided 
by extensive academic literatures in disciplines such as health 
psychology, mass communication and the public understanding 
of science. In this paper, I want to present the case for another 
discipline, that of applied logic, to also play a role in the con-
struction of public health messages. Specifically, it will be ar-
gued that a branch of logical inquiry known as informal logic 
contains a vast literature that has been almost completely over-
looked by those whose role it is to devise and convey health ad-
vice to the public. This is in spite of the fact that many of the 
arguments that are the basis of this advice (e.g., argument from 
consequences) are vibrant areas of study within informal logic. 
In other publications, several of these arguments, including ana-
logical argument, question-begging argument and the argument 
from ignorance, have been examined in public health contexts 
(Cummings, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2011). In this paper, 
a further argument, or rather group of arguments, which has 
been extensively investigated in informal logic, will also be ex-
amined in a public health context. Although known by various 
names, we will refer to these arguments as fear appeal argu-
ments. 
The long tradition in logic has been to view the arguments 
which will be examined in this paper as flaws or errors of rea-
soning. It is only in the last thirty to forty years that these so-
called informal fallacies have been cast in a different, and more 
positive, light. When examined in certain contexts and evaluated 
against non-deductive standards, these arguments have been 
found to have non-fallacious variants. In this way, fallacy theo-
rists have characterized non-fallacious forms of the argument 
from ignorance, question-begging argument and arguments that 
appeal to force, amongst others (Cummings, 2000; Walton, 
1985, 1992; Woods, 1995, 2004). In the last couple of years, 
some fallacy theorists have gone a step further in their character-
ization of these argument forms by presenting them as reasoning 
heuristics (Cummings, 2010; Walton, 2010). In this way, Cum-
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mings (2010: 78) has represented certain informal fallacies as 
reasoning heuristics that "bestow epistemic gains on scientific 
inquiry in contexts of uncertainty." The scientific inquiry exam-
ined by Cummings was that conducted into the emergence of 
B S E in British cattle, a particularly protracted and difficult epi-
sode in the public health of the U K . 1 For his part, Walton (2010: 
160) proposes that "heuristics are closely connected to fallacies" 
and that heuristics are "a mediating concept between the notions 
of fallacy and defeasible argumentation scheme." W e wi l l return 
to Walton's views subsequently. In the meantime, we begin by 
examining the type of fear appeal argument that is the focus of 
this paper. This examination wi l l include both its treatment in 
logic and in public health. W e then consider how the notion of a 
heuristic has been employed in the literature on reasoning and 
informal fallacies. Finally, a new view is developed of the heu-
ristic role of fear appeal arguments in a public health context. 
2. Arguments that threaten or appeal to fear 
Consider the following description of an anti-smoking video 
produced by the American Lung Association (1988). The video 
is entitled Hugh McCabe: The Coach's Final Lesson: 
Mr. McCabe was a teacher and football coach in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland. He had been a lifelong ciga-
rette smoker. After being diagnosed with terminal lung 
cancer, he made arrangements for this film, his final leg-
acy. The video documents, in detail, Mr. McCabe's de-
cline. Viewers see Mr. McCabe go from an energetic man 
to a frail man whose hearty voice has become a whis-
per—the cancer has invaded his throat. Viewers watch as 
Mr. McCabe's doctor shows X-rays of his diseased lungs, 
and describes how he will die. They watch as Mr. McCa-
be expresses regrets about the experiences he will never 
have: He will never see his two sons graduate from high 
school, and he will never know his grandchildren. The fi-
nal scene depicts Mr. McCabe's funeral and his coffin 
being carried out of a church. Throughout the video, Mr. 
McCabe tells the viewers that cigarettes are the cause of 
1
 Although the focus of the current paper is on the receiver of public health 
messages (i.e., members of the general public) rather than on the producer of 
these messages (i.e., public health experts), it is important to emphasize that 
many of the logical errors and cognitive biases that, I will argue subsequent-
ly, lay people are prone to making in their reasoning are also evident in the 
reasoning of the public health experts who issue health-related advice. Such 
errors and biases are analysed at length in Cummings (2010) in the context of 
a study of the reasoning of scientific experts in relation to the BSE problem. 
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his lung cancer and that he would not have lung cancer if 
he were not a smoker (Schmitt and Blass, 2008: 147-8). 
Schmitt and Blass (2008: 148) remark of this video 
"[although not theoretically conceived as a fear appeal, this 
videotape meets the definition of one. It presents a severe threat 
with fear-arousing consequences (lung cancer) that could have 
been avoided by taking the recommended response (not smok-
ing)." These remarks touch on three issues which have made the 
characterization of fear appeal arguments difficult and conten-
tious for theorists. The first of these issues concerns the relation-
ship between fear and threat. As Schmitt and Blass describe this 
fear appeal, its purpose is to issue a threat with fear the (inevita-
ble) consequence of this threat. We will see below that this par-
ticular characterisation of fear appeals is contested by some the-
orists. The second issue concerns the nature of fear appeals as a 
type of argument from consequence—Schmitt and Blass explic-
itly acknowledge the role of "consequences," in this case the 
development of lung cancer, as a key component in the structure 
of the argument. The third issue concerns the actions that could 
have been taken by the addressee of the fear appeal argument to 
avoid the undesirable consequence of developing lung cancer. In 
the social science literature on fear appeal arguments, these ac-
tions must display both self-efficacy (a person's belief that they 
can undertake the recommended action) and response efficacy (a 
person's belief that the recommended action will successfully 
avert the undesirable consequence) in order for a fear appeal ar-
gument to work. In addressing all three of these issues further 
below, we will be covering some of the main logical issues per-
taining to fear appeal arguments as well as some of the social 
scientific literature on these arguments. 
It is clear from the analysis of the above scenario present-
ed by Schmitt and Blass that fear appeal arguments involve the 
issue of a threat to an addressee (this scenario formed the 'high-
threat condition' in their experimental study of anti-smoking 
fear appeals). This threat then induces fear in a person which 
presumably acts as a trigger to modify one's behaviour in the 
recommended way. This close identification of threat with fear 
is commonplace in the public health literature on fear appeals. 
For Thompson et al. (2009: 182), the terms 'threat' and 'fear' 
are used interchangeably: "Our focus in this paper is on messag-
es that are conveyed, and how anti-smoking campaigns, in par-
ticular, construct their appeals; with a specific focus on threat or 
fear-appeal campaigns." In other investigations, threat and fear 
are acknowledged to be distinct concepts which operate along-
side each other in practice. For example, in a meta-analysis of 
fear appeal arguments in public health campaigns, Witte and A l -
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len (2000: 592) state that "[w]hile fear and threat are conceptu-
ally distinct (the former is emotion, the latter is cognition), they 
are intricately and reciprocally related, such that the higher the 
perceived threat, the greater the fear experienced." In a study of 
the use of fear appeals in HIV prevention, Smerecnik and Ruiter 
(2010: 551) employ the notion of threat within their definition of 
a fear appeal: " A fear appeal combines threat information and 
coping information.... An individual is motivated to perform the 
recommended protective action only if a threat is perceived and 
if the recommended action is believed to be effective in averting 
the threat and easy to perform." Clearly, regardless of where one 
turns in the literature on the use of fear appeal arguments in pub-
lic health, the notions of threat and fear are treated as essentially 
inseparable. 
However, the situation is quite different when one comes 
to examine how fear appeal arguments have been addressed in 
logic. Walton (2000) gives an excellent account of the historical 
developments that saw the argumentum ad baculum move 
through a series of definitions beginning with appeal to force 
(the literal meaning is "argument to the stick"), then to the use 
of threat in argument and finally as an appeal to fear in argu-
ment. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no mention of an argument 
that corresponds to ad baculum in Aristotle's list of fallacies in 
On Sophistical Refutations, although Aristotle does discuss fear 
appeal arguments in Rhetoric (Walton, 2000). Ad baculum was 
consistently defined as an appeal to force up until the late 1940s 
when the notion of threat was used for the first time alongside 
force (Walton, 2000: 34). It was in 1956 that ad baculum came 
to be defined for the first time as an appeal to fear in argument 
as opposed to an appeal to force (Walton, 2000: 38). These 
transitions in the definition of the argument were ushered in by 
the publication of logic textbooks, certain of which presented 
examples that forced a reconsideration of earlier definitions of 
the argument. But what they demonstrate is that logicians have 
been much less inclined than investigators in public health and 
social science to treat fear and threat appeals as one and the 
Walton (2000: 46) remarks of these textbooks as follows: "there is evidence 
of a certain degree of dissonance in the textbook treatments of the ad bacu-
lum. On the one hand, they maintained the traditional practice of describing 
the argumentum ad baculum as appealing to force, but the examples they 
gave are more subtle cases rather than overt or more brutal appeals to force. 
On the other hand, more and more elements of intimidation and indirect 
threats came to be present in the examples used to illustrate the fallacy. The 
headline or the primary heading described the argumentum ad baculum as 
being appeal to force. But in the descriptions of the argument given under 
that heading, typically the concept of threat was brought in, as it was in Copi, 
and the concept of appealing to fear was brought in, although in a lesser 
manner, as it was in Copi." 
Fear Appeal Arguments in Public Health 31 
same type of argument. Walton (2000: 147-8) explicitly distin-
guishes fear and threat appeal arguments along the following 
lines: "a fear appeal argument is (necessarily) an intentional at-
tempt by the speaker to frighten the hearer, whereas a threat ap-
peal argument is not...the threat appeal argument and the fear 
appeal argument are inherently different. Neither is a subspecies 
of the other." It emerges that logicians observe certain concep-
tual distinctions in their treatment of these arguments that are 
either overlooked or conflated by social scientists. 
The second issue raised by Schmitt and Blass's definition 
of fear appeal arguments concerns their nature as arguments 
from consequence. Walton (2000: 140) characterizes fear appeal 
arguments as a type of argument from negative consequence. 
This argument has the following structure: 
If you (the respondent) bring about A, then B will occur. 
B is a very bad outcome, from your (the respondent's) point 
of view (or interests). 
Therefore, you (the respondent) should not bring about A. 
Certain features of this argument are noteworthy, accord-
ing to Walton. Firstly, this argument shares the same second 
premise and conclusion as the following argument, which Wal-
ton (2000: 140) calls a conditional baculum threat argument: 
I (the proponent) undertake to see to it that B will occur if 
you (the respondent) bring about A. 
B is a very bad outcome, from your (the respondent's) 
point of view (or interests). 
Therefore, you (the respondent) should not bring about A. 
However, to the extent that Walton treats fear and threat appeals 
as two distinct types of argument, some way must be found of 
distinguishing these two arguments from negative consequence. 
That way lies in the first premises of these respective arguments. 
Only in the latter argument—the threat appeal—is the arguer 
indicating a commitment to undertake the negative consequence. 
In the former argument—the fear appeal—there is no explicit 
commitment of this type. As Walton remarks (2000: 141) 
"whether B comes about is up to nature—or at least there is no 
stipulation that any persistent agent stands ready to see to it per-
sonally that B will occur." So the distinction between fear and 
threat appeal arguments that is attested to by certain logicians, 
and largely overlooked by social scientists, now has a form in 
the logical structure of these arguments. Secondly, the conclu-
sion of both these arguments is a practical ought (should) state-
ment (Walton, 2000: 140). This reflects the fact that these argu-
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ments are a form of practical reasoning of the type that is used in 
deliberation and planning. This feature of these arguments is 
particularly significant when it comes to the question of their 
evaluation. It was described in Section 1 that many of the infor-
mal fallacies began to be characterized as non-fallacious when 
logicians began to assess them against non-deductive standards 
of argument. These same standards will be applied to the evalua-
tion of fear appeal arguments in Section 4. Specifically, it will 
be argued that when assessed as a form of practical reasoning, 
fear appeals arguments are not just rationally warranted, but that 
they serve a faciltitative (heuristic) function within our reason-
ing. 
The third issue raised by Schmitt and Blass's definition of 
a fear appeal argument—actions that can avert an undesirable 
consequence—brings us to a discussion of some of the findings 
that have emerged from social scientific research into fear ap-
peal arguments. This research has revealed, for instance, that 
fear appeals are most effective, i.e., are most likely to induce 
behaviour change, when a strong fear appeal is combined with a 
high-efficacy message, and are least effective, i.e., likely to pro-
duce defensive responses, when strong fear appeals are com-
bined with low-efficacy messages (Witte and Allen, 2000). 
Cognitive beliefs are known to act as mediators of fear appeal 
messages on intention. In a study of condom use in HIV preven-
tion, Smerecnik and Ruiter (2010) found that anticipated regret 
(i.e., the expected post-behavioural affective consequences of 
not performing a behaviour that would keep one healthy) medi-
ated the coping-intention relationship, with high coping infor-
mation increasing anticipated regret which, in turn, increased the 
intention to use condoms. Fear appeals have also been found to 
elicit quite different responses in individuals in different stages 
of change. In a study of the effects of fear appeals that promoted 
skin cancer preventive behaviour, Cho and Salmon (2006) found 
greater defensive and fatalistic thinking in individuals who were 
in the precontemplation stage of change. These individuals were 
less receptive to message recommendations, displayed weaker 
intentions to engage in recommended behaviour and performed 
less preventive behaviour than those who had contemplated or 
previously undertaken preventive behaviour. Other findings in-
dicate that personality traits or demographic characteristics such 
as gender do not appear to influence how fear appeals are pro-
cessed, although there is evidence that the cultural orientation of 
respondents (i.e., individualist versus collectivist orientation) is 
a significant factor in the processing of these arguments (Mur-
ray-Johnson et al., 2001; Witte and Allen, 2000). 
Social scientists have also generated a number of theoreti-
cal models to explain these findings about the effects of fear ap-
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peal arguments. These models are the drive model (Janis, 1967), 
the parallel response model (Leventhal, 1970), the protection 
motivation model (Rogers, 1975) and a model that combines 
features of all three, the extended parallel process model (Witte, 
1992). The drive model states that fear appeals arouse fear 
which acts as a drive to motivate actions. Fear has both facilitat-
ing (e.g., taking self-protective measures) and interfering (e.g., 
avoidance) effects according to this model. The model predicts 
that the more fear that is aroused the greater the attitude change. 
But this occurs only up to a point, after which individuals seek 
to reduce their fear by other means, such as not attending to the 
message. This model was abandoned when it became clear that 
the relationships predicted between fear arousal and attitude 
change were not supported by empirical findings. The parallel 
response model posits two separate but interdependent process-
es: danger control processes (those directed at reducing the dan-
ger) and fear control processes (those directed at reducing one's 
fear about the danger). These processes operate simultaneously 
(rather than sequentially) and permit subjects two quite different 
responses to fear appeals. Although this model introduced a 
cognitive component not present in the drive model—subjects 
chose different responses and formed a plan of action—it failed 
due to its inability to predict the stimulus conditions that would 
cause subjects to choose one response or the other. 
The protection motivation model develops the cognitive 
response to fear appeals further. Rogers's original and revised 
model identified the cognitive mediators that led to message ac-
ceptance. These so-called cognitive mediating processes includ-
ed severity of threat, probability of occurrence, coping response 
efficacy and self-efficacy. Rogers proposed a four-way interac-
tion between the dimensions of threat (severity and probability 
of occurrence) and efficacy (response efficacy and self-
efficacy). The recipient of a fear appeal undertakes a rational 
calculation of the probability of certain outcomes (hence, the use 
of the term 'subjective expected utility' to describe these mod-
els). Although studies did not support Rogers's hypothesis, in-
vestigations have identified that one threat variable can interact 
with one efficacy variable to influence outcomes such as behav-
iour change. The final model, Witte's extended parallel process 
model (EPPM), proposes the following steps in the processing 
of fear appeals. A message is firstly evaluated for the threat that 
it contains. If the threat is perceived to be insignificant or irrele-
vant, then the fear appeal is simply ignored. If people believe 
there is a serious threat to which they are susceptible, then they 
are motivated to begin a second appraisal of the message. This 
second appraisal is an evaluation of the efficacy of the response 
that is recommended. When people believe the recommended 
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action is effective in reducing the danger and that they are able 
to undertake this action (i.e., high perceived response efficacy 
combined with self-efficacy), then they become motivated to 
control the danger and lessen the threat. However, if people 
doubt their ability to undertake the recommended action (i.e., 
low perceived self-efficacy) and/or there is uncertainty that the 
action will actually work (i.e., low perceived response efficacy), 
they are motivated to control their fear through defensive re-
sponses such as denial (Witte and Allen, 2000). The predictions 
of this model have been tested in fear appeal campaigns de-
signed to promote responsible drinking among college students 
and reduce the spread of genital warts (Moscato et al., 2001; 
Witte et al., 1998). 
3. Heuristics and reasoning 
The above discussion of fear appeal arguments is by no means 
exhaustive. However, it nevertheless conveys the main features 
of these arguments as they have been described and analyzed by 
logicians and social scientists. These two groups of theorists 
have contributed insights into fear appeal arguments that will be 
relevant to the view of these arguments developed in the next 
section. For their part, logicians have developed normative 
frameworks for the evaluation of fear appeals. These frame-
works, many of which have a pragmatic orientation, are increas-
ingly characterizing fear appeals as rationally warranted argu-
ments in certain contexts of use. The view of fear appeals as 
cognitive heuristics, which will be developed in the next section, 
extends the more positive evaluations of these arguments that 
these frameworks have made possible. Social scientists have 
contributed to the study of fear appeal arguments an extensive 
understanding of the conditions under which people respond to, 
and ignore, the actions recommended by these arguments. 
Knowledge of these conditions will also be integral to the view 
of fear appeals as cognitive heuristics developed in Section 4. 
The convergence of logic and social science that my view of 
fear appeals entails will leave some readers uneasy. For logi-
cians of a traditional bent, such a closely forged alliance raises 
the spectre of psychologism in logic. For their part, social sci-
I concur with the stance on psychologism taken by Gabbay and Woods (to 
appear) in their empirically sensitive logic: "Investigators who make room 
for context and agency are drawn to a form of what used to be called the 
Laws of Thought approach and, accordingly, are committed to an element of 
psychologism in logic...Psychologism is once again an open question in the 
research programme of logical theory. Its re-emergence should not be pre-
judged. Better to wait and see how, once it is up and running, a psychologi-
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entists will be averse to the normative orientation of my view 
with its emphasis on the evaluation of reasoning. These objec-
tions reflect legitimate concerns by those who raise them. How-
ever, they can only be fully addressed in another context. For 
our present purposes, suffice it to say that the explanatory poten-
tial offered by a convergence of these disciplines far outweighs 
any difficulties raised by these objections. 
So logical and social scientific considerations, I am claim-
ing, must come together to forge the view of fear appeals as 
cognitive heuristics that is advanced in this paper. The notion of 
a heuristic has been employed in a range of domains, including 
computing, engineering and psychology. As such, definitions 
have tended to vary. In general, a heuristic is a type of shortcut 
through a problem that is beneficial to an agent in that it is eco-
nomical with respect to cognitive effort and effective in achiev-
ing cognitive goals. Smithson (2008: 210) states that "at least 
some heuristics earn their keep by being not only fast and frugal, 
but also sufficiently accurate to be effective or adaptive." The 
idea that heuristics play a role in reasoning is certainly not new. 
Reasoning heuristics were first systematically studied by Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. In their landmark article 
"Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases," Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974: 1124) described a number of heuristics 
that reasoners use in probabilistic reasoning: "Many decisions 
are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain 
events... people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles 
which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations." Although 
Tversky and Kahneman acknowledged that heuristics could be 
useful, they were concerned to emphasise the "severe and sys-
tematic errors" to which heuristics could lead. One such error is 
known as the gambler's fallacy, the belief that random processes 
self-correct: " i f [a random] sequence has strayed from the popu-
lation proportion, a corrective bias in the other direction is ex-
pected" (Tversky and Kahneman, 2004: 193). 
By the time heuristics began to be discussed in the context 
of public health problems, an altogether more benign view of 
these cognitive operations was beginning to take shape. The 
emphasis now was less on the errors in reasoning to which heu-
ristics might lead and more on their facilitative function in deal-
ing with complex problems. Trumbo (2002) and Johnson (2005) 
discussed heuristics in two studies that applied a heuristic-
systematic model to the assessment of health risk. These studies 
required subjects to assess health risks that were communicated 
cally real, agent-based logic fares as a theory of reasoning" (italics in origi-
nal). 
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in epidemiological information about cancer rates (Trumbo) and 
which were posed by a semi-hypothetical industrial facility 
(Johnson). Johnson (2005: 632) states that 
[a]... heuristic-systematic model (HSM) separate[s] sys-
tematic from heuristic information processing. The sys-
tematic approach...is deliberative, attends to detail, 
weighs alternative views, and assesses argument quality 
in judging the validity of persuasive messages. The heu-
ristic approach is alert to cues (e.g., trusted groups' eval-
uation of the information) and simple decision rules (if 
encoded in memory, accessible to recall, and deemed re-
liable) justifying quick intuitive judgment. 
Factors which are likely to induce subjects to process infor-
mation systematically or heuristically have also been examined 
in a public health context. Some of these factors relate to fear 
and threat. Kim and Paek (2009) found that a group of subjects 
motivated by accuracy were more likely to engage in systematic 
processing of information relating to the risks of G M food, 
while those motivated by impression were more likely to em-
ploy heuristic processing. Jepson and Chaiken (1990) found that 
subjects with high chronic fear of cancer were less likely to en-
gage in systematic processing of messages than subjects with 
low fear. Subjects for whom a health message has high personal 
relevance have been found to engage in biased systematic pro-
cessing, in which they are more critical of threatening parts of a 
message than parts of a message which they find reassuring 
(Liberman et al., 1992). 
So, heuristics are not without precedent in the literature on 
reasoning or, indeed, in public health reasoning. But this litera-
ture has not so far addressed in a wholly convincing manner 
why heuristics are likely to be the dominant mode of reasoning 
in matters of public health. There are a number of reasons why 
this is likely to be the case. Firstly, systematic reasoning pro-
cesses require subjects to make assessments of argument quality, 
a logical task in which the rational merits of different forms of 
evidence are considered. Yet, empirical studies suggest that sub-
jects rarely engage with evidence sources in this manner. In-
stead, they are more likely to subscribe to a number of "rules of 
thumb" in assessing evidence, particularly when this evidence 
relates to an area that embodies expert knowledge. In a study of 
the public's understanding of food risks, Green et al. (2005: 
525) remarked as follows: 
[Fjormal or 'scientific' sources of evidence were rarely 
cited to justify decisions about or assessments of food 
risks. This is not because participants were 'irrational' 
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about potential risks, simply that, in making complex 
choices in an arena with considerable 'expert' infor-
mation available, pragmatic decision aids are needed. 
Commenting on a paper by Gj ernes about Sami reindeer herd-
ers, Alaszewski and Coxon (2008: 418) state that: 
She [Gj ernes] notes that they [Sami herders] are aware of 
public health knowledge about health which is grounded 
in epidemiological evidence. Thus, they are aware of the 
health risk of smoking, not taking regular exercise and 
not eating vegetables and fruit. However, they filtered 
this advice through their traditional beliefs and practices 
developing particular forms of lay heuristics to guide 
their decisions. 
While Sami herders are capable of subjecting epidemiological 
evidence to rational scrutiny, in their daily affairs they are more 
likely to adopt intuitive heuristics as a guide to decision-making. 
Secondly, public health problems are uniquely challenging 
in terms of the impact of prior beliefs, attitudes and worldviews 
on subjects' responses to messages. These cognitive states are 
the basis of a number of biases in our thinking, biases which are 
likely to reduce compliance with the actions recommended in 
messages. One such bias is the optimistic bias, the belief that a 
subject's risk from a certain agent or behavior is less than that 
for the rest of the population (Weinstein, 1980, 1984).4 One can 
imagine how such a bias would reduce the effectiveness of 
many public health messages—for example, the subject who 
practices unprotected sex but who believes that he or she is at 
less risk of contracting H I V than everyone else who practices 
unprotected sex. Another bias in our thinking is the confirmato-
ry bias, in which subjects interpret messages and events in line 
with their existing attitude position.5 This bias is likely to dimin-
ish the force of many public health messages. In messages urg-
Weinstein characterizes this bias in the following terms: "They [people] 
expect others to be victims of misfortune, not themselves. Such ideas imply 
not merely a hopeful outlook on life, but an error in judgment that can be 
labeled unrealistic optimism" (1980: 806; italics in original); "A number of 
studies have shown that people's comparative risk judgments are optimisti-
cally biased; that is, they tend to think their own chances of experiencing 
health and safety problems are less than the chances of their peers" (1984: 
431-2). 
"People are exhibiting confirmatory bias when they (1) seek out and accept 
information that is consistent with their beliefs or biases, (2) ignore infor-
mation that is not consistent with their beliefs or biases, or (3) interpret in-
formation to support or confirm their beliefs or biases" (Covello, 2010: 
1110). 
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ing smoking cessation, for example, the public health communi-
cator is trying to bring a respondent's beliefs about smoking in 
line with those expressed in the message. However, the confirm-
atory bias is pulling subjects in the opposite direction—the 
negative content expressed in the message about smoking is in-
terpreted in line with the smoker's positive beliefs about smok-
ing, thus reducing the likelihood that he or she will desist from 
smoking. Finally, there is evidence that in relation to health 
risks, subjects can assume a fatalistic worldview.6 To the extent 
that respondents believe they have very little control over risks 
to their health, they are unlikely to believe that they are capable 
of undertaking health-enhancing behaviours (i.e., self-efficacy) 
or that these behaviours will be effective in bringing about 
health improvements (i.e., response efficacy). Like cognitive 
biases, a fatalistic worldview is likely to reduce the effectiveness 
of public health messages. 
Clearly, our thinking is influenced by a number of cogni-
tive biases that are not conducive to the reception of public 
health messages. I contend that heuristics such as fear appeal 
arguments serve as a useful corrective to these biases. Specifi-
cally, heuristics enable us to bypass systematic reasoning pro-
cesses that appear to be vulnerable to these biases and, in doing 
so, achieve a respondent's compliance with the actions recom-
mended in public health messages. A well-crafted fear appeal 
argument, for example, seeks to counter the lack of self-efficacy 
and response efficacy that the cognitive mindset of fatalism en-
genders. A fear appeal argument with high threat content can 
serve as a valuable corrective to the optimistic bias—the person 
who believes that he or she is exposed to less health risk from a 
certain activity than other members of the population will strug-
gle to uphold this thinking in the presence of strong fear-
provoking images and descriptions. Even apart from cognitive 
biases, heuristics can help subjects to bypass systematic reason-
ing on other grounds. It is widely recognized that trust is an af-
fective heuristic that allows subjects to bypass a lack of 
knowledge in systematic reasoning. In a study of trust and 
knowledge in the context of hazardous technologies and activi-
ties, Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000) found strong correlations 
between social trust and perceived risks and benefits only when 
subjects did not possess much knowledge of the technologies 
concerned. Findings such as these have led investigators to the 
view that a range of emotional and affective processes serve a 
In the 1992 Canadian national health risk perception survey (Krewski et al., 
1995), it was found that approximately half of respondents adopted a fatal-
istic worldview, with responses evenly split with respect to agreement with 
the statement "I have very little control over risks to my health." 
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useful heuristic function in a range of contexts including public 
health.7 It is to an examination of the heuristic function of one 
emotion-based appeal, the appeal to fear, that we now turn. 
4. Fear appeal as a cognitive heuristic 
Thus far, I have argued that fear appeal arguments constitute 
heuristics that perform a useful corrective function to cognitive 
biases which can afflict systematic reasoning processes. Other 
heuristics based on trust, it was argued, helped subjects bypass a 
lack of knowledge during systematic reasoning. The view of 
heuristics that is taking shape in this paper is not one in which 
heuristic reasoning is a poor alternative to systematic reasoning 
which is only employed when logical considerations desert us. 
Rather, heuristic reasoning operates in parallel with systematic 
reasoning,9 a position from which it can shore up the more vul-
nerable logical processes of systematic reasoning.10 In this final 
Thirlaway and Heggs (2005: 108) state that "emotion has been conceptual-
ized as a heuristic, a mental shortcut, whereby people access their pool of 
positive and negative feelings towards an issue to guide judgement." 
Even theorists who take a positive view of the value of heuristics invariably 
end up characterizing them as inferior to the logical processes of systematic 
reasoning. For example, Walton (2010: 162) states that "[a] heuristic is only a 
shortcut, and i f there is enough time for more evidence to be collected, a bet-
ter method can often be found. The controlled, conscious and slow system of 
reasoning can pose critical questions, looking at evidential considerations pro 
and contra. A n argument based on a heuristic might stand up or not under 
this more detailed kind of scrutiny." The italicized words in this quotation 
suggest that Walton is not prepared to afford to heuristics the value that he 
attaches to the "controlled, conscious and slow system of reasoning." 
9 
Social scientific research into fear appeal messages has tended to character-
ize the relationship between systematic and heuristic processing in antagonis-
tic terms, i.e., messages are processed systematically or heuristically, but not 
both concurrently. A study by Hale et al. (1995) largely confirmed this pat-
tern with low-fear message recipients engaging in systematic processing and 
high-fear message recipients engaging in heuristic processing. However, the-
se investigators also found evidence of concurrent processing with low-
anxiety subjects engaging in both systematic and heuristic processing of mes-
sages. 
These processes are vulnerable in the sense of being the locus of cognitive 
biases and other problems (e.g., lack of knowledge). This vulnerability, I 
would argue, is related to the fact that systematic reasoning is a more recent 
development in terms of our cognitive evolution. Heuristic reasoning pro-
cesses are part of an older evolutionary system and are more robust in nature. 
They owe their robustness to evolutionary pressures exerted on our cognitive 
resources over many years. This view is consistent with dual-process theories 
of reasoning and cognition, as Walton (2010: 161) acknowledges: "Accord-
ing to dual process theories in cognitive science, there are two distinct cogni-
tive systems underlying human reasoning. One is an evolutionarily old sys-
tem that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast.... The oth-
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section, I want to develop further this view of heuristics, and 
fear appeal argument in particular, as an adjuvant to logical rea-
soning, contra those theorists who treat heuristics as a less relia-
ble alternative to logical reasoning. Through their capacity to 
avert biases and other pitfalls of logical reasoning, heuristics as-
sume a rational standing in this account that has seldom been 
properly acknowledged by theorists of reasoning. How to char-
acterize that standing is the second task of this section. Only one 
theorist, Douglas Walton, has so far attempted to give an ac-
count of the rational standing as heuristics of the types of argu-
ments within which fear appeals are routinely included, the so-
called informal fallacies. According to Walton (2010), heuristics 
involve jumping to a conclusion with such jumps overlooking 
prerequisites of a defeasible argumentation scheme for a certain 
type of argument. It will be shown subsequently that this ac-
count is not wholly satisfactory for the view of fallacies as heu-
ristics that is developed in this paper. We conclude with a sug-
gestion for how these heuristics might be better captured. 
In his account of fear appeal argument, Walton (2000) dis-
cusses a television commercial that conveys a message against 
drinking and driving. The content of the commercial will be fa-
miliar to television viewers. A boy causes the death of his girl-
friend through drunk driving. He is pictured in a distressed state 
pleading with paramedics to be allowed to accompany her in the 
ambulance to hospital. A police officer is shown breaking the 
news of the girl's death to her parents. Walton (2000: 9) follows 
a description of the commercial with the following comments: 
Is it fair or reasonable to categorize such an ad as a falla-
cious fear appeal argument (ad metum), because the ar-
gument appeals to emotion instead of presenting evidence 
(in the form of statistics on fatalities and drunk driving, 
for example)? 
It was described in Section 3 how evidence did not always enter 
into an assessment of health-related risks in ways that we might 
expect if people were driven by logical considerations. In that 
section, subjects who undertook assessments of food-related 
risks were shown to disregard scientific sources of evidence in 
favour of "pragmatic decision aids." Also, Sami reindeer herd-
ers, it was argued, could assess epidemiological evidence about 
health-related risks, but were much more likely to use "lay heu-
ristics" in making assessments of these risks. What these cases 
demonstrate is that systematic reasoning processes, in which 
er is a system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow.... 
The old system uses what are called heuristics to rapidly jump to a conclu-
sion or course of action." 
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people carefully reflect on sources of evidence in a rational 
evaluation of argument, is something of an idealization of the 
logical performance of subjects. While subjects may, on occa-
sion, engage with evidence in this manner, more often than not 
they are inadequately equipped or motivated to do so. There is 
no clearer example of how our logical performance deviates 
from this ideal than when subjects come to assess the type of 
statistical evidence mentioned above by Walton. In the present 
scenario, this evidence will describe the (increased) likelihood 
or probability of a fatal car accident occurring if one drinks and 
drives. The problem is that an assessment of this evidence re-
quires subjects to engage with probabilistic information when a 
long list of empirical studies beginning with Tversky and 
Kahneman's now classic experiments indicate that this is a ra-
ther weak area of logical performance. Berry (2004: 27) cap-
tures our difficulties in this area when she states that: 
[T]here is now a firm body of evidence showing that 
many people are subject to various cognitive difficulties 
when interpreting probabilistic information. Furthermore, 
we are all prone to a range of cognitive biases, and our 
interpretation of risk information is often influenced by 
the particular way in which it is presented to us. 
Berry presents an excellent overview of empirical work in 
this area. She discusses experimental findings which indicate 
that people have difficulty interpreting percentages (for this rea-
son, health messages often present probabilities as frequencies 
rather than as percentages), that people prefer to use verbal 
probability expressions (e.g., "likely," "rare") over numbers to 
convey risks (but prefer to be given numerical probabilities in 
risk information), and that context influences how people inter-
pret percentages and verbal probability labels. She also de-
scribes how judgements are excessively influenced by the total 
number of people who are adversely affected by a drug, etc. 
(there is insufficient consideration of the size of the overall 
sample in a particular case) and how relative risk reductions 
have a greater impact on health behaviours than information 
which is expressed as absolute risk reductions. If we add to the-
se specific difficulties with probabilistic information a number 
of cognitive biases, such as the optimistic bias and confirmatory 
bias, the picture that emerges is a fairly gloomy one about our 
prospects for successfully handling the statistical evidence to 
which Walton refers. The question now is that if viewers of this 
television commercial are unlikely to be able to use logical pro-
cesses of reasoning in an assessment of the risks posed by drink-
ing and driving, what other cognitive resources can be success-
42 Louise Cummings 
fully exploited by the producers of the commercial to dissuade 
viewers from engaging in this potentially injurious behaviour? 
The answer is fear appeal argument used as a cognitive heuris-
tic. 
The producers of the drinking and driving commercial, I 
am claiming, have little prospect of achieving their goal of re-
ducing this behaviour if they develop a message that viewers 
must process using logical, systematic reasoning. So prone is 
this form of reasoning to a range of errors and cognitive biases 
that it is best avoided, particularly on those occasions when the 
human costs of not successfully communicating a message are 
great. The public health communicator should aim to engage the 
recipients of a message in heuristic reasoning. This reasoning is 
not only as accurate as more systematic processes of reason-
ing11—at least on a sufficiently large number of occasions—but 
it also provides subjects with a means of bypassing potentially 
erroneous logical processes. (Of course, this is not to say that 
heuristic reasoning is guaranteed to eliminate logical or other 
errors of reasoning. Moreover, as demonstrated in Cummings 
(2010), heuristics can themselves be sources of error when they 
are misapplied in a certain context.) With its roots in an older 
cognitive system, heuristic reasoning has been shaped by evolu-
tionary pressures which have better prepared it to withstand the 
types of errors to which systematic reasoning so readily suc-
cumbs. Some of these errors stem from the additional complexi-
ty of systematic processes. This complexity, which is eschewed 
by heuristics, introduces a greater number of opportunities for 
error to occur—put quite simply, there are more things that can 
go wrong. By embodying simplicity, heuristics reduce the like-
lihood of error. To cite Todd and Gigerenzer (2000: 727), their 
"simplicity leads to robustness." When used as a cognitive heu-
ristic, fear appeal argument is directly availing of the benefits 
that have been accrued by heuristic reasoning as a result of its 
adaptations to evolutionary pressures over many years. These 
benefits mean that fear appeal argument can achieve results for 
the public health communicator that are less likely to be realised 
by systematic reasoning. The results of interest are intention 
Quite apart from being less accurate than systematic reasoning processes, 
simple heuristics have been found to perform comparably to more complex 
algorithms: "[W]e show how simple building blocks that control information 
search, stop search, and make decisions can be put together to form classes of 
heuristics, including: ignorance-based and one-reason decision making for 
choice, elimination models for categorization, and satisficing heuristics for 
sequential search. These simple heuristics perform comparably to more com-
plex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data" (Todd and 
Gigerenzer, 2000: 727). 
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change and behaviour modification. We examine this point fur-
ther below. 
To the extent that a fear appeal argument is attempting to 
influence the actions of subjects, it is a type of practical reason-
ing. In effect, the aim of the public health communicator is to 
encourage recipients of a message to choose one course of ac-
tion (e.g., the cessation of smoking) over another course of ac-
tion (e.g., the continuation of smoking). The action-oriented na-
ture of practical reasoning sets in place normative standards for 
the evaluation of reasoning which are very different from those 
that apply in theoretical contexts. For example, in practical rea-
soning a cognitive agent must consider temporal aspects of his 
or her situation in a way that the person who is engaged in theo-
retical reasoning can largely disregard. Similarly, in practical 
reasoning a cognitive agent must make an assessment of the ur-
gency of his or her situation, as decisions quite often must be 
taken in advance of complete knowledge of a health risk. In 
practical reasoning, agents must assess the consequences of par-
ticular courses of action, some of which may be very grave in-
deed. These various exigencies of the practical sphere can be 
seen throughout public health. Many public health issues are de-
fined by temporal considerations, such as the length of exposure 
to a health risk. Public health actions are routinely taken in ad-
vance of full knowledge of a health risk, such as when quaran-
tine measures are introduced to control the spread of a newly 
emerging infectious disease. Also, the consequences of not un-
dertaking public health actions, or undertaking the wrong ac-
tions, are often quite serious in terms of their toll on human 
health and well-being. Fear appeal argument is uniquely placed 
to address these practical imperatives. It is able to do so, I con-
tend, because it is highly adapted to the exigencies of the practi-
cal sphere in a way that other modes of reasoning are not. 
Fear is a powerful emotion that can move people to action. 
But it is the particular way in which it does this that makes fear 
appeal argument so effective as a heuristic. Above, it was de-
scribed how fear appeal argument bypasses systematic processes 
of reasoning which are prone to error and biases. This same ca-
pacity to bypass these processes is what makes fear appeal ar-
gument so well attuned to features of the practical sphere. In its 
careful consideration of evidence in an assessment of argument 
quality, systematic reasoning is slow and time consuming. By 
bypassing these processes, fear appeal argument can help sub-
jects come to judgement on a problem with a speed that is more 
in keeping with the temporal demands of their context. Also, by 
bypassing extensive deliberations surrounding evidence in sys-
tematic reasoning, fear appeal argument can jump straight to de-
cisions about which courses of action to pursue. This satisfies 
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the practical imperative in public health in particular to institute 
protective actions in advance of full evidence and knowledge 
about a health risk. Finally, by bypassing systematic reasoning 
processes, we avoid the suppression of fear—systematic pro-
cesses, after all, achieve the subordination of emotional factors 
to logical considerations. Fear appeal argument unambiguously 
confronts us with a particularly unpleasant consequence of not 
pursuing a recommended course of action—we will continue to 
experience fear. Of course, we may deflect that fear by engaging 
in defensive reactions such as denial. But even the very threat of 
such prolonged psychological discomfort may be all that is re-
quired to achieve compliance with certain recommended behav-
iours. It emerges that as well as being an important corrective to 
logical errors and cognitive biases in systematic reasoning, fear 
appeal argument is well equipped to address the demands of the 
practical sphere. 
The practical orientation of fear appeal arguments has im-
plications for whatever normative framework we choose to cap-
ture the rational features of these arguments. Clearly, this 
framework cannot be based on deductive notions of validity and 
soundness, i.e., the logical standard embodied by systematic rea-
soning processes. Rather, fear appeal argument demands a nor-
mative model that attests to a range of pragmatic features, such 
as temporal features of context, the urgency of deliberation, and 
the consequences of action and inaction. For Walton (2010: 
164), that model consists in a defeasible argumentation scheme 
which is the focus of critical questions: "This scheme is defeasi-
ble. It is not deductively valid.... Such a defeasible scheme is 
inherently subject to critical questioning." These questions are 
modelled via assumptions and exceptions (both types of premis-
es) that are added to the explicit premises in the full scheme of 
the argument. Assumptions and exceptions may be taken to rep-
resent responses to questions that aim to lay bare the rational 
grounds of a particular argument. For example, in the case of the 
argument from expert opinion (see Figure 1), an assumption to 
the effect that an individual E is an expert in the field to which 
claim A belongs is central to the rational standing of this argu-
ment. A parascheme, which models the heuristic that corre-
sponds to the full scheme, overlooks these assumptions and ex-
ceptions. This can be seen in Figure 1 below where the heuristic 
jumps to a conclusion ("A is true") on the basis of just two ordi-
nary premises without taking into account any of the assump-
tions and exceptions: 
Fear Appeal Arguments in Public Health 45 
Ordinary Premises 
£ is an expert. £ asserts that A . 
Assumptions 
£ is sufficiently knowledgeable 
as an expert source. 
£ is an expert in the field that A is in 
£ s assertion is based on evidence 
If £ is an expert and £ says 
that/4 is true, then A is true. 
What £ asserted implies A. 
( Exceptions J 
E is personally reliable as a source. 
A is consistent with what other 
experts assert. 
Figure 1: Heuristic of Argument from Expert Opinion, 
taken from Walton (2010: 170) 
Walton (2010: 171) characterizes the particular heuristic repre-
sented in Figure 1, the heuristic of argument from expert opin-
ion, as taking us by a "fast and frugal leap directly to the conclu-
sion." In so doing, it bypasses the implicit conditional premise 
in the top right corner of the above diagram, as well as the as-
sumptions and exceptions. The consideration of these additional 
factors requires processing time that is only afforded by the 
"controlled, conscious, and slow inferential procedure of the 
new cognitive system." The old cognitive system of reasoning, 
which is the home of heuristic procedures, sacrifices this addi-
tional deliberation with a view to achieving certain efficiencies, 
such as an increase in the speed of processing. 
Walton (2010: 175) envisages a similar parascheme as the 
basis for the heuristic relating to fear appeal argument: "Espe-
cially the emotional fallacies like appeal to fear seem to be 
based on heuristics that would respond well to paraschematic 
treatment." Like the argument from expert opinion above, the 
heuristic corresponding to a fear appeal argument involves leap-
ing to a conclusion, usually to take a certain course of action, 
without consideration of a range of conditions which might 
make such a course of action ill-advised in a particular case: 
Fear is an emotion that moves people powerfully to ac-
tion and may tend to make them put more careful consid-
erations of the complex features of a situation aside. An 
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immediate response may be to jump to a conclusion, 
powerfully motivated by fear, instead of taking a more 
realistic look at all the factors involved in a decision. The 
heuristic for this kind of reasoning runs as follows. If I 
carry out action a, it may bring about consequence C. 
Consequence C is really scary. Therefore, there is no way 
I am going to bring about action a (Walton, 2010: 178). 
However, I want to argue that there are reasons for believ-
ing that a parascheme is not completely adequate as a model of 
the factors that are at work in fear appeal argument used as a 
heuristic. According to Walton's account, a parascheme is de-
rivative upon the full scheme for an argument, from which it 
stakes its claim to rational justification. So the heuristic that is 
modelled by a parascheme is rationally justified, at least on cer-
tain occasions, because it draws upon an argumentation scheme 
in which explicit premises and (implicit) assumptions and ex-
ceptions are the outcome of critical questioning. The difficulty 
with this arrangement is that it reverses what is, I believe, the 
correct relationship between a full argumentation scheme and its 
corresponding parascheme. As Walton acknowledges, heuristics 
are part of an "old cognitive system" which is prior, in evolu-
tionary terms, to the systematic reasoning processes of the new 
cognitive system. Walton's full argumentation schemes are part 
of this new cognitive system. As such, I contend, they cannot 
precede paraschemes, as Walton's characterization would have 
it. Full argumentation schemes are a later evolutionary achieve-
ment and are, accordingly, emergent upon the heuristic reason-
ing processes that Walton is modelling as paraschemes. We 
should think of full argumentation schemes as an exercise in 
theoretical rationality in which the complete grounds of an ar-
gument are laid bare. But what precedes these schemes—what 
they are, in effect, a development or expansion of—is a type of 
rapid, simplistic reasoning in the form of heuristics. 
Evolutionary considerations, it emerges, necessitate a re-
versal in the relationship between Walton's full argumentation 
schemes and paraschemes. This reversal is further necessitated 
by the conditions that provide a rational justification of the heu-
ristic reasoning in paraschemes. For Walton, this reasoning de-
rives its rational standing from the full argumentation scheme 
which sits alongside the parascheme. In the full scheme, all im-
plicit premises of an argument are laid bare as a result of critical 
questioning. The explicit argument which emerges from this 
critical questioning is presumed to justify the corresponding 
heuristic. I believe Walton's characterization of the relationship 
between a full argumentation scheme and a parascheme misrep-
resents the conditions that provide a rational justification of heu-
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ristic reasoning. If a parascheme is derivative upon a full argu-
mentation scheme, as Walton claims is the case, then it can seem 
as if conditions laid out in the full scheme do indeed justify the 
heuristic reasoning of the parascheme. But if, as I am arguing, 
heuristic reasoning is justified by conditions in the practical 
sphere, then we must once again adopt a different view of the 
relationship between a full argumentation scheme and para-
scheme. Specifically, heuristic reasoning has arisen to address 
practical exigencies within our environment, e.g., the need to 
respond with urgency to problems. To this extent, heuristics may 
be seen to be an evolutionary adaptation to conditions in the 
practical sphere. It is these conditions, I contend, that ultimately 
provide a rational justification of the different patterns of rea-
soning that we have been describing in this paper as heuristics. 
In casting a parascheme as dependent on a full scheme for its 
rational justification, Walton loses sight of the practical rational-
ity that ultimately justifies heuristic reasoning. 
In summary, I have argued that heuristic reasoning is an 
evolutionary adaptation to certain practical conditions that con-
front cognitive agents within their environment. It is these con-
ditions of the practical sphere that provide a rational justification 
of the rapid, efficient cognitive procedures that we have been 
calling heuristics. However, with the evolution of higher-order 
cognitive abilities, human beings have developed the capacity to 
expand heuristics into longer, detailed logical structures of the 
type we have been calling systematic reasoning. Where heuristic 
reasoning aims for simplicity and speed, systematic reasoning 
embodies complexity and slowed processing. To the extent that 
heuristics are justified on practical grounds and systematic rea-
soning is a later evolutionary development than heuristic reason-
ing, I have argued for a revision of Walton's parascheme model 
of heuristics. Specifically, I have contended that paraschemes 
are prior to full argumentation schemes in both evolutionary and 
conceptual terms, and are not derivative upon them, as Walton's 
model would have it. The primacy of heuristic reasoning, and 
parascheme models thereof, is not an explanatory convenience. 
Rather, this arrangement is needed in order to locate fear appeal 
arguments and other heuristics within the type of practical ra-
tionality that is their evolutionary origin. 
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